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Note
Resurrecting the Challenge Against
Retroactive Estate Tax Legislation:
Acquiescing to the Holding of
United States v. Carlton-Over
My Dead Body
INTRODUCTION
Nothing is certain but death and the taxes.'
Two topics which often cause consternation in people of many
ages are death and taxes. Death is inauspicious for obvious rea-
sons, and even honest pragmatists detest paying taxes.2 However,
as the old adage asseverates, both are facts of life. Death is the
price we must pay for living, and "[t]axes are what we pay for civi-
l. The origin of this proverb is uncertain, but it first appeared in a collection
of proverbs entitled, Collectanea, compiled by V.S. Lean in 1904. Treasury of World
Masterpieces: Dictionary of Quotations and Proverbs 403 (D.C. Browning ed., Oc-
topus Books Ltd. 1982) (1951).
2. As Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote, "[oif all debts men are least willing
to pay the taxes." Ralph Waldo Emerson, Compensation, in Essays 1830-1840.
History abounds with notable examples of tax evaders, even among otherwise hon-
orable members of society. Coincidentally, or possibly consequently, Emerson was
the chief mentor of one of the most influential conscientious objectors to the pay-
ment of a tax, Henry David Thoreau. See The Columbia Encyclopedia 2737 (Bar-
bara A- Chernow & George A. Vallasi eds., 5th ed. 1993). Thoreau expressed his
individuality and made a symbolic statement about man's natural freedom when
he refused to pay a poll tax that supported the Mexican War. See id. Thoreau led a
solitary life of passive civil disobedience that had far-reaching effects on the future,
including the nonviolent human rights movements led by Gandhi and Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. See id. at 2737-38; see also Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience
(F.H. Revell Co., 1964) (discussing passive resistance of civil government).
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lized society."3 Despite the inevitability of both, each is dreaded in
its own right; in combination, the two begin to overwhelm the
psyche.
The federal estate tax is the epitome of such a combination. It
imposes a tax "on the transfer of the taxable estate of every dece-
dent who is a citizen or resident of the United States."4 The "taxa-
ble estate" is maximized for the government's benefit by beginning
with the broadest definition of "gross estate" that appears in any
section of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 Although "gross estate" is
comprehensively defined, Congress did decide to permit deductions
for certain transfers that could have remained within the gross es-
tate, e.g., bequests to a surviving spouse;6 transfers for public,
charitable or religious uses;7 and certain expenses, indebtedness
and taxes.8 However, the broad scope of the property interests
that do get included in the gross estate far outweighs the benefit of
these deductions, e.g., general powers of appointment, 9 transfers
with a retained life estate,10 transfers taking effect at death," rev-
3. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Reve-
nue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927), quoted in The Quotable Lawyer 299 (David S.
Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986).
4. I.R.C. § 2001 (1997).
5. See id. § 2031. "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be de-
termined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time
of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situ-
ated." Id.
6. See id. § 2056 (granting an unlimited marital deduction for any amounts
transferred outright to a surviving spouse).
7. See id. § 2055.
8. See id. § 2053.
9. See id. § 2041. A general power of appointment is the power to designate
the person or persons who will receive property or the income derived therefrom.
The person holding the power need not be the owner of the property or have any
other rights in the property. This section is constructed broadly to include powers
of appointment that were exercised or released. See id. § 2041(a)(2). Furthermore,
merely allowing the power to lapse is considered a release and would therefore be
included. Id. § 2041(b)(2). However, a slight exemption is granted to the extent
that the transfer does not exceed the greater of $5000 or 5% of the aggregate value
of the assets over which the power could have been exercised at the time of the
lapse. See id.
10. See id. § 2036.
11. See id. § 2037.
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ocable transfers, 12 proceeds of life insurance 13 and adjustments for
transfers within three years of the decedent's death. 14
The Supreme Court has determined that Congress clearly pos-
sesses the authority to impose an estate tax even though the Con-
stitution does not explicitly grant such power. 15 Without
challenging this conclusion, the intriguing tack is to examine the
policy of having such a tax. Naturally, the goal of the tax is to
raise revenue-a power explicitly granted to Congress, out of prac-
tical necessity, in the Constitution. 16 However, the rationale for
choosing to raise revenue by imposing a tax upon a person after
death rather than as an income tax is more amorphous and diffi-
cult to defend. Even under the Supreme Court's succinct defense
of Congress's broad authority to tax,17 this authority is less defen-
sible in the realm of an estate tax: 18 "Any classification of taxation
is permissible which has reasonable relation to a legitimate end of
governmental action. Taxation is but the means by which govern-
ment distributes the burdens of its cost among those who enjoy its
benefits."' 9 Assuming the person paid income taxes proportionate
12. See id. § 2038.
13. See id. § 2042. Life insurance proceeds, even those payable directly to a
designated beneficiary are included in the gross estate if the "decedent possessed
at his death any of the incidents of ownership," and such incidents include the
power to change the beneficiary, the power to cancel the policy, the power to pledge
the policy for a loan, and the possibility that the proceeds might possibly revert to
the decedent's estate. Id.
14. See id. § 2035. This is the most expansively inclusive section because it
brings back into the gross estate any interest in property that was transferred by
the decedent within the three years immediately preceding the decedent's death if
that interest would have been included under sections 2036, 2037, 2038 or 2042, if
the interest had been retained by the decedent. See id. § 2035(a), (d)(2).
15. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 56 (1900).
16. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
17. The Court views congressional power in the arena of taxation as nearly
plenary. "Although the Supreme Court has struck down a variety of statutes be-
cause of their retroactive effects, it has never struck down an income tax provision
on this ground, and no modern Court has held any federal tax provision illegal."
Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. Legal Stud. 265, 270 n.12
(1993). However, even Levmore admits, at least implicitly, there may be a distinc-
tion between income tax treatment, and estate and gift tax treatment. See id. at
271 n.12 ("The few cases that do strike down retrotaxes involve retroactive estate
and gift tax provisions.").
18. In a similar vein, other authors argue that gift tax laws deserve a higher
level of scrutiny than income tax amendments. See, e.g., Pat Castellano, Comment,
Retroactively Taxing Done Deals: Are There Limits?, 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 417 (1995).
19. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 144 (1938).
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to the benefits enjoyed during life, what further benefits does the
corpse enjoy? Presumably, the benefit being taxed is the right to
transmit property to survivors at death,20 but this may be viewed
more as a necessity than a right considering the fact that you can-
not take it with you. 21
Congress enacted the general provisions of our current federal
estate tax scheme in 1916 out of the crisis of World War I, but the
policy of the tax was already deeply embedded in the ideal of
America-equal opportunity for all. 22 Rather than permitting the
accumulation of wealth to be passed from one generation to the
next, the estate tax seeks to redistribute the wealth and to prevent
the aggrandizement of family fortunes. As President Theodore
Roosevelt told Congress in 1906, " 'the prime object should be to
put a constantly increasing burden on the inheritance of those
20. This is the distinct definition of an estate tax as compared to an inheri-
tance tax which is a tax imposed on the privilege of receiving property from a dece-
dent at death. Compare Black's Law Dictionary 550 (6th ed. 1990) with id. at 783.
However, one might ponder whether an estate tax would be foregone if property
did remain with the decedent. For instance, when the decedent is buried wearing
jewelry, does the value of the jewelry get exempted from the value of the gross
estate because it is not transferred at death? The obvious Internal Revenue Ser-
vice answer is no. The IRS argues that the tax is on the right to transfer and not
the actual transfer of property. This accepted interpretation taxes the decedent in
the proposed scenario for a benefit she does not exercise and enjoy. Therefore, the
right to transmit her wealth is illusory. In all circumstances, the IRS taxes the
decedent as if the entire gross estate is passed on to the survivors. The decedent
has no right to avoid the estate tax by taking property to the grave.
In the alternative case, where a decedent has made a completed transfer that
will be included in her estate because it was made within three years of death, see
I.R.C. § 2035, the insistence that the estate tax is based upon the right to transfer
causes a contradiction if applied retroactively. "If the taxpayer has already com-
pleted the transaction, a tax upon the privilege of consummating it is a contradic-
tion in terms. The taxpayer has no choice in the matter." Laura Ricciardi &
Michael B.W. Sinclair, Retroactive Civil Legislation, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 301, 342
(1996) (quoting Julius H. Amberg, Retroactive Excise Taxation, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
691, 694-95 (1924)).
21. See supra note 20 for a discussion of the difference between the privilege
to transfer and the necessity to transfer. While this theory seems to undercut the
rationale for any imposition of an estate tax, it may actually strengthen the posi-
tion that retroactive changes in the estate tax are not offensive. See Welch, 305
U.S. at 147 ("[Tlhere are other forms of taxation whose retroactive imposition can-
not be said to be similarly offensive, because their incidence is not the voluntary
act of the taxpayer.") The argument preys on the proverb which introduces this
Note. Since everyone will inevitably die, any tax incurred upon death is unavoida-
ble, and thus, does not violate due process.
22. See Boris I. Bittker et al., Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 5 (7th ed.
1996).
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swollen fortunes which it is certainly no benefit to this country to
perpetuate.' "23 The general sentiment is that the amassing of
wealth equates to the amassing of power: a condition which threat-
ens the fiber of a democratic society. Even though this theory
seeks to protect the common blue-collar worker, the concept still
offends one's sense of decency.24 In fact, people who spend their
lives working hard and paying income taxes are even more upset
than those who inherit immense wealth, by the idea that, if they
are successful and fortunate enough to create a large estate,25 fur-
ther taxes will be due upon death.
Take this natural reaction to the concept of an estate tax, add
the notion of the finality and sanctity of death, then throw in the
idea of retroactive lawmaking, and you have created an odious
amalgamation. People have recognized the unjustness of retroac-
23. Id. at 3 (quoting 17 Works of Theodore Roosevelt 434 (1925)). President
Roosevelt advocated not only an estate tax, but also one that implemented a pro-
gressive rate. He would be pleased with the current transfer tax rate schedule
which begins at 18% and rapidly increases, finally topping off at 55% for all estates
over three million dollars. See I.R.C. § 2001(c). From 1941 to 1976, the top tax rate
was as high as 77%. See Bittker et al., supra note 22, at 6.
24. In a recent article regarding the possibility that Congress will eliminate
the estate tax altogether, Senator Robert Packwood is on record as saying, "foes [of
the estate tax] are motivated by a 'passionate' sense of the tax's unfairness. It is
... simply 'an American opposition.'" Jackie Calmes, Washington Is Moving To
Alter the Certainty of Death and Taxes, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1997, at Al, available
in 1997 WL 2418576. Though the idea is gaining support in Congress, it is un-
likely that the estate tax will be dropped entirely because, in order to balance the
budget, an estimated one hundred billion dollars would have to be found elsewhere
to make up for the losses over just the next five years. See id.
25. The pivotal amount at present is $600,000 because a unified credit of
$192,800, which equals the tax due on $600,000, is available to every decedent. See
I.R.C. § 2010. This seems like an amount beyond the reach of many citizens, but
considering the breadth of property interests included in the taxable estate, see
supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text, and the low cost of large insurance poli-
cies which will be included, see id. § 2042, the threshold is often unexpectedly
broached by average working families. For this reason, in a recent push to have
the estate tax eliminated, "support has grown, and a coalition covers florists, bak-
ers and RV-camp owners among others." Calmes, supra note 24, at Al. Although
the estate tax did not get eliminated, this year Congress passed the Taxpayer Re-
lief Act of 1997, which does reduce the burden of estate taxes. See Act of January 7,
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34. The act provides incremental increases in the unified
credit so that the maximum amount which can be sheltered from estate taxes be-
comes $625,000 in 1998, $650,000 in 1999, and eventually peaks at $1,000,000 in
the year 2006. See id. Unfortunately, and even more significantly in the face of the
105th Congress's munificent tax changes, Congress retains the power to lower or
eliminate the amount sheltered by the credit, even in a retroactive manner and
even for a mere change of mind. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
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tive lawmaking since the development of the social contract. In
the Federalist Papers, Madison declared "ex post facto laws... are
contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every
principle of sound legislation."26 Similarly, in Justice Story's clas-
sic commentaries on the Constitution, he observed that
"[rietrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has
been forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation, nor with
fundamental principles of the social compact."27 In the 1798 semi-
nal case on ex post facto, Calder v. Bull,28 Justice Chase summa-
rized the argument from natural law: "The purposes for which men
enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social
compact .... The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State
Governments, amount to a prohibition of such [retroactive] acts of
legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid
them."2 9
Even in the face of this apparent categorical abhorrence for
retrospective legislation, the majority and two concurring opinions
in Calder v. Bull all distinguished criminal acts from civil acts, and
held that the Ex Post Facto Clause only prohibited retroactive ap-
plication in the criminal sphere.30 The Court has maintained this
distinction without exception for the past two hundred years, and
now it "is so well settled as to have become one of the common-
places of American constitutional law."31 Additionally, since the
New Deal Era, the modern Court has been utterly deferential to
the legislature, especially in the area of economic legislation, and
even when the legislation has involved retroactivity or touched a
right arguably within the protection of substantive due process.3 2
In the field of taxation, the Court should subject retroactive
legislation to a heightened level of scrutiny because, as Chief Jus-
26. The Federalist No. 44, at 301 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
27. 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§ 1398 (5th ed. 1891).
28. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
29. Id. at 388.
30. See id. at 390, 397 (Paterson, J., concurring), 399 (Iredell, J., concurring).
31. Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 315,
315 (1921), quoted in Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 20, at 301 n.10. But see Har-
old J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Law-
making, 84 Geo. L.J. 2143 (1996) (attacking the criminal/civil distinction,
especially in light of the resurgent defense of private property rights by the Court).
32. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Ap-
proach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1063-64 (1997).
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tice Marshall declared, "the power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy."33 However, the Court has always been lenient with regard
to the federal taxing power, placing it in "a league of its own,"34
even during the peak of the Court's scrutiny of economic legislation
during the Lochner era. Nevertheless, estate taxes are in their
own realm within taxation, and retroactive estate tax laws should
be restricted because the person they destroy has already passed
from this world and has no recourse. 35 Yet, even retroactive estate
tax regulations receive great deference from the Court.36 Despite
the modern trend of the Court to extend substantive due process
protections to rights implied within the concepts of life and lib-
erty,37 the Court continued to reject the due process challenge
against retroactive legislation based on an expanded definition of
property in United States v. Carlton3s-this time explicitly in re-
gard to estate taxation.3 9 Though the concordant outcome reached
33. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819).
34. See Andrew C. Weiler, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial Rubber-
stamping of Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 Duke L.J. 1069, 1082-88 (1993).
35. In point of fact, any levy of an estate tax is in essence retrotaxation be-
cause it is a tax after death upon wealth accumulated during life. While this con-
cept alone is sufficient to offend many people, the retroactive application of a
statute passed after one's death that imposes a new tax burden on the decedent's
estate may be characterized as Kafkaesque. While this description alludes to the
bizarre and illogical nature of such a retroactive application, see in particular
Kafka's own express concerns in "The Problem of Our Laws." Franz Kafka, The
Problem of Our Laws, in The Complete Stories 437 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., 1971)
("[Nevertheless it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does
not know.").
36. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994); United States v.
Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986); Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
37. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down
a local ordinance that limited occupancy of dwellings to members of the same "fam-
ily," where "family" was basically defined as related individuals, because "personal
choice in matters of ... family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(upholding a woman's right to an abortion because the privacy rights implicated
trigger protected liberty interests); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(preserving a married couple's right to use contraception as within protected lib-
erty interests); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that procrea-
tion is a basic liberty deserving constitutional protection).
38. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
39. Without retracing the denouement of the Court's active role during the
Lochner era, it is sufficient for the present purposes to note that "since 1937 the
Court's abandonment of Lochner-style substantive due process review of economic
regulation has been unequivocal." Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 807
(2d ed. 1991).
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by all nine judges in Carlton may be correct for different reasons, 40
the troubling holding of the case sends a vivid message despite the
muddled language of the opinion. The Court declares that a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate purpose will be sufficient to up-
hold a retroactive estate tax regulation. 41 The Court grants the
highest level of deference to Congress and appears to forget its role
as characterized by Chief Justice Holmes when he stated, "[tihe
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."42
Part I of this Note traces the history of due process challenges
to retroactive economic legislation and the standards created by
the Court to assess such attacks. This section concludes by resus-
citating the due process argument from the perspective of prop-
erty's fundamental qualities and the trend of the modem Court to
expand substantive due process. Part II sets forth the facts of
Carlton, the unique test established by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court's holding which rejected the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning and reaffirmed the precedent of total def-
erence to Congress in the area of economic legislation, prospective
or retroactive. This section also elucidates the concurring opinions
of Justices O'Connor and Scalia to provide the foundation for the
argument which follows. Part III illuminates several flaws of the
holding in Carlton, and proposes to limit congressional authority
within the estate tax field because this domain is inundated with
fundamental rights and can be differentiated from other areas of
economic legislation. Part IV agrees that the outcome in Carlton
may be accurate, but illustrates the potentially devastating effects
of the Court's deficient reasoning. This Note concludes that the
estate tax field is sufficiently distinct from other areas of economic
legislation, and even from other tax fields. Therefore, it should re-
ceive unique treatment. The Court should reexamine its position
because the taxation of estates presents an opportunity for the
Court to begin to circumscribe Congress's current nearly un-
restricted power to tax retroactively.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31-32.
42. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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I. BLACK LETTER LAW OF CALDER v. BULL BECOMES CARTE
BLANCHE FOR CONGRESS
Retroactive legislation appears to offend the natural law of de-
cency, the principles inherent in the creation of the social compact
and the underlying tenets of the Constitution. Man has recognized
the unfairness of retrospective laws and harbored hostility toward
them as far back as ancient Greece.43 Prohibition of laws which
attempt to affect prior actions is a building block of the social com-
pact upon which our Republic rests.44 Comments by the Framers
evince their scorn for retroactive legislation and buttress the asser-
tion that the original intent of the Constitution was to prohibit all
attempts at retroactive lawmaking.45
Several clauses of the Constitution seem, some even explicitly,
to bar retroactive laws categorically: the Ex Post Facto Clause, the
Bill of Attainder provision, the Contracts Clause, the Takings
Clause and the Due Process Clause. Yet, despite the text of the
Constitution and the appeal of a universal rejection of retroactive
laws, the Supreme Court never has wavered from its Calder v. Bull
averment that retroactive legislation is permissible in the civil con-
43. See Laura Ricciardi, Comment, The Aftermath of United States v. Carlton:
Taxpayers Will Have to Pay for Congress's Mistakes, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 599,
603 (1996) (citing Aristotle, The Politics (Sir Ernest Barker Trans., 1947) and quot-
ing St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 145 (R.J. Henle trans., Univ. of Notre
Dame Press 1993) (1273)) (NIn order for a law to obtain the power of obligating
which is proper to a law, it must be applied to those who are to be directed by it.
This application takes place by being made known to them by promulgation.
Therefore, promulgation is necessary for law to have its binding force."). By neces-
sary implication, no law should be given retrospective effect because people should
not be obligated to laws of which they have no notice.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
45. Many law review articles provide quotations evidencing the Framers' lan-
guage and intent that the Constitution prohibit all retroactive legislation. For the
most extensive discussion, see Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 20, at 302-12. One
Framers' intent argument unique to the estate tax field, and not presented else-
where, stems from the slogan of the American Revolution itself, "No Taxation
Without Representation." The essence of the argument is that altering the tax
laws to increase the tax burden on the estate of a person who is no longer living is
taxation without representation. This type of taxation is patently unfair for the
same reason that the revolutionary battle cry originated. The taxed party, in the
case of estate taxes, the decedent, has no recourse. For a fuller explication of this
argument, see infra Part III.B.
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text-a holding which is now two hundred years old.46 Though vi-
able challenges may still be available under each constitutional
theory, this Note deals only with a unique attack from the due pro-
cess perspective in the estate tax field.
In the beginning of this century, due process challenges fared
well in the areas of attempted retroactive estate and gift taxes.47
As the Court's strict review of economic regulations burgeoned in
the aftermath of Lochner v. New York, 48 it appeared retroactive tax
legislation faced an insurmountable hurdle. With the demise of
the Lochner era, however, the Court's deference to congressional
authority in the realm of all economic legislation blossomed. Two
early indicators of the Court's deferential shift were Milliken v.
United States49 and Welch v. Henry.50
In Milliken, the decedent made an inter vivos gift of corporate
stock to his children in 1916.51 At the time of the gift, the Revenue
Act of 1916 contained a provision which included this gift in the
gross estate of the decedent because it was considered a transfer in
contemplation of death.5 2 In 1918, a new act increased the rate at
which the transfer in question would be taxed.53 When the donor
father died in 1920, the Commissioner insisted on taxing the gift at
the higher rate.54 Milliken claimed the application of the statute
to his case denied him due process because it was retroactive. 55
The Court recited its precedent established in Nichols v. Coolidge56
and Untermeyer v. Anderson57 that taxation of completely vested
46. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). The Court has occasionally
struck down specific retroactive civil legislation as unconstitutional, but never as a
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
47. See, e.g., Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928) (invalidating a ret-
roactive gift tax on due process grounds); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927)
(holding a retroactive gift tax invalid because of the "unreasonableness" with re-
gard to a completed transfer); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (finding a
retroactive estate tax unconstitutional because its application was "arbitrary and
capricious").
48. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
49. 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
50. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
51. Milliken, 283 U.S. at 18.
52. See id. at 18-19.
53. See id. at 19.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 18-20.
56. 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
57. 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
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gifts prior to enactment of a statute taxing such transfers was "so
palpably arbitrary and unreasonable as to infringe the due process
clause."5 8 Then, with sleight of pen, the Court stated that "a tax is
not necessarily and certainly arbitrary and therefore invalid be-
cause retroactively applied."59 Marking the end of the apparent
categorical reproach for retroactive estate and gift tax laws, the
Court declared that "[it is necessary to consider the nature of the
tax and of the decedent's gift."60 Since the amended statute of
1918 was based on the same policy rationale as the 1916 act when
it was adopted, the Court held that the donor was forewarned of
the tax and the "mere increase in the tax" was insufficient to cause
constitutional infirmity.61
Seven years after Milliken, the Court revisited the issue of re-
trotaxation and formulated a more definitive test in Welch v.
Henry. In 1933, Welch received corporate dividends in a manner
which permitted a deduction on his Wisconsin state income tax re-
turn at the time of the distribution and at the time for filing the
return on March 15, 1934.62 The Wisconsin legislature passed an
act on March 27, 1935, which "laid new taxes for the years 1933
and 1934," and eliminated the provision under which Welch had
claimed the dividends as a deduction.63 In response to Welch's
due process challenge, the Court reiterated the language of Milli-
ken and appended a more explicit standard to it. "In each case it is
necessary to consider the nature of the tax and the circumstances
in which it is laid before it can be said that its retroactive applica-
tion is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional
limitation."64 The indeterminate "harsh and oppressive" formula-
58. Milliken, 283 U.S. at 20-21 (citing Untermeyer, 276 U.S. 440; Nichols, 274
U.S. 531).
59. Id. at 21.
60. Id. at 22,
61. Id. at 24. This reasoning presents an interesting twist in the Carlton case
which is expounded below, see infra Part II. Though the denial of the deduction in
Carlton can be equated to a mere increase in the tax, the policy behind the amend-
ment is arguably distinct from the policy responsible for the original statute. The
original statute provided a broad deduction for transfers to Employee Stock Own-
ership Plans as an incentive to increase such transfers and help employees gain
ownership within companies. The amendment restricting the deduction to stock
owned by decedents immediately prior to death was enacted solely to enhance the
national fisc-an entirely different rationale than under the original enactment.
62. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 141 (1938).
63. Id. at 141-42.
64. Id. at 147.
130 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:119
tion became the touchstone for judicial review of due process at-
tacks on retroactive taxation.
In the line of cases dealing with other economic regulations,
the Court has repeatedly stated that a presumption of validity ex-
ists, and the critical test is whether the "legislature has acted in an
arbitrary and irrational way."65 In the 1984 case of Pension Bene-
fit Guaranty Corp. v. RA. Gray & Co., 66 the Court expressly de-
clared that the two standards, "harsh and oppressive" and
"arbitrary and irrational," though different in verbiage, entail the
same analysis.67 The analysis is merely low level scrutiny to deter-
mine whether the statute has a rational legislative purpose. The
Pension Guaranty decision states that an added burden exists for
laws having a retroactive effect, "[blut that burden is met simply
by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is it-
self justified by a rational legislative purpose."68
From the initial proclamation of the standards to the present,
the Court has continued to lower the necessary criterion while the
level of deference has increased. 69 In Carlton, despite avowals to
the contrary, the Court has finally ceded carte blanche to Congress
with regard to revenue raising taxation 70-as if there is any other
kind.
65. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
66. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
67. Id. at 733 ("[A1lthough we have noted that retrospective civil legislation
may offend due process if it is 'particularly 'harsh and oppressive," that standard
does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation
that we clearly enunciated in Turner Elkhorn.") (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 730.
69. For a thorough examination of the Court's analysis of economic legislation
pre-Lochner and post-Lochner, see James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for
Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 Cornell L.
Rev. 87 (1993). Professor Kainen depicts "Lochner era substantive due process as
a transitional period with strong links to its antecedent and successor forms of
constitutional economic rights protection.... Lochner era substantive due process
grew out of retroactivity jurisprudence, transforming it in accordance with a cri-
tique with which the modern era has significant affinity." Id. at 123.
70. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). The majority attempts to
limit its holding by labeling the amendment in question a "curative measure." Id.
at 31. But Justice O'Connor's concurrence observes that all amendments to ex-
isting statutes are "curative," otherwise the original would not need amending. See
id. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority also clings to its prior distinction
between "wholly new taxes" and mere changes in existing tax laws. See id. at 34.
For a discussion of the illusory quality of the distinction, see infra note 99. The
argument was shaky when the Court first posited it in United States v. Darus-
mont, 449 U.S. 292, 300 (1981), to distinguish the early cases of Blodgett and Un-
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Before beginning the analysis of Carlton, a brief summary of
its relationship with the current state of substantive due process is
necessary. The Court has been continually increasing the scope of
individuals' protected rights in life, liberty and property, through
the Due Process Clause. The Court has stretched the language of
the Fifth Amendment to include implied rights, so long as the right
is considered "fundamental."71 During this period, the Court has
been heedful of its progression, itself remarking that:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field
for this Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives
enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without
the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights.... [Tihere is reason for concern lest the only limits to
such judicial intervention become the predilections of those
who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.72
Despite this cognizance of the potential dangers, the Court contin-
ues to extend the constitutional protections. In a case heard the
same term as Carlton, the Court upheld the rights of a private
property owner against a land use regulation.73 Yet somehow in
Carlton, the Court was able to determine that property rights
which conflict with tax legislation do not trigger a higher level of
scrutiny, even when the regulation has retroactive effect.
termeyer which involved the first gift tax. Now, after nearly a century since the
inception of the gift and estate tax schemes, there is nothing that could not be
argued is only an alteration of the existing regulatory tax structures. Justice
Scalia is unmistakably correct when he remarks, "Itihe reasoning the Court ap-
plies to uphold the statute in this case guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will
henceforth be valid." Carlton, 512 U.S. at 40 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
71. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (de-
nying a constitutional right to die because the right to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment is not fundamental); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding the
right to an abortion because a woman's privacy interest is sufficiently fundamental
to be encompassed in the meaning of a protected liberty interest); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (preserving a married couple's right to use contracep-
tion because marital privacy is fundamentally within the "penumbra" of protected
liberty interests).
72. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
73. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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IL FACTS AND HOLDING OF CARLTOV: COURT UPENDS CARLTON'S
WIN IN THE NINTH
Willametta K. Day died on September 29, 1985.74 Jerry W.
Carlton was the executor of her estate, and the estate tax return
was not due until December 29, 1986 because a six month filing
extension had been obtained. 75 On behalf of Day's estate, Carlton
purchased 1.5 million shares of stock in MCI Communications Cor-
poration for a total price of $11,206,000 on December 10, 1986.76
Two days later, he sold all of the shares to the MCI Employee
Stock Ownership Plan for $10,575,00, despite realizing a loss of
$631,000. 77 These transactions enabled Day's estate to claim a de-
duction for half of the stock sale proceeds, $5,287,000, which had
the effect of reducing the estate tax by $2,501,161.78 The estate
claimed the deduction pursuant to section 2057 of the Internal
Revenue Code in effect at the time which read:
(a) General Rule-For purposes of the tax imposed by section
2001, the value of the taxable estate shall be determined by
deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal
to 50 percent of the proceeds of any sale of any qualified em-
ployer securities to-
(1) an employee stock ownership plan, or
(2) an eligible worker-owned cooperative. 79
On February 26, 1987, a bill was introduced in each chamber
of Congress, at the Internal Revenue Service's request, to "clarify"
the fact that the deduction was limited to securities owned by the
decedent immediately before death. 0 Section 2057 was amended
on December 22, 1987, with an effective date as if it had been in-
cluded in the original legislation as follows:
(1) In General.-For purposes of this section, the proceeds of
a sale of employer securities by an executor to an employee
stock ownership plan or an eligible worker-owned cooperative
74. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 28.
75. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 6075 (providing that estate tax returns must be
filed within nine months of the decedent's death).
76. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 28.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. I.R.C. § 2057 (1986), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, § 7304(a), 103 Stat. 2352.
80. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29 (citing I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432,
442; 133 Cong. Rec. 4145 & 4293 (1987)).
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shall not be treated as qualified proceeds from a qualified sale
unless-
(A) the decedent directly owned the securities immedi-
ately before death .... 81
In accord with the amended provisions of section 2057, the In-
ternal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction claimed by Carl-
ton and asserted a tax deficiency because Day did not own the MCI
stock before her death.8 2 In a stipulation between the parties,
Carlton acknowledged that he conducted the stock transactions
specifically to avail the tax benefits of section 2057.83 After paying
the deficiency plus an additional $996,953.18 in interest, Carlton
challenged the retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to
the 1986 transaction as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 84
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the litany of Supreme Court cases
dealing with due process challenges to retroactive legislation and
determined that the "harsh and oppressive" standard must govern
in this case because "[c]ourts 'must 'consider the nature of the tax
and the circumstances in which it is laid before it can be said that
its retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to trans-
gress the constitutional limitation." "85 The circuit court also rec-
ognized that outside of the tax realm, "a statute must be 'arbitrary
and irrational' to violate due process,"8 6 but in application by the
Supreme Court the two standards are equivalent.8 7 From its thor-
81. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 10411(a), 101 Stat. 1330-
432.
82. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29.
83. See id. at 28-29. This fact does not bear on the appropriateness of Carl-
ton's actions because attempts to minimize taxes through any legal means are jus-
tified. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935) ("Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possi-
ble; ... there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes .... [I]t is of no
consequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of [estate] taxes ...
84. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. (quoting United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1986) (quoting
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938))).
86. Id. at 1056 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15
(1976)).
87. See id. (citing Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467
U.S. 717, 733 (1984) ("[Allthough we have noted that retrospective civil legislation
may offend due process if it is 'particularly 'harsh and oppressive," that standard
does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation
that we clearly enunciated in Turner Elkhorn.") (citations omitted)).
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ough examination of the pertinent cases,88 the Ninth Circuit de-
rived two critical questions to determine whether a retroactive
application of a tax law violated the enunciated standard. "First,
did the taxpayer have actual or constructive notice that the tax
statute would be retroactively amended? Second, did the taxpayer
rely to his detriment on the pre-amendment tax statute, and was
such reliance reasonable?"8 9 The application of this two-part test
led the Ninth Circuit to conclude a violation of due process had
occurred because: (1) the transaction was completed in December
1986, before the first notice of the proposed change in January
1987; (2) the tax advantages of section 2057 reasonably induced
Carlton to engage in the transaction; and (3) the estate irretriev-
ably lost $631,000.90
88. The court discussed the three critical cases from the beginning of the cen-
tury where retroactive tax legislation was found to be a violation of due process.
See id. at 1056-57 (reviewing Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Blodg-
ett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927)). Then
the court canvassed the modem trend of cases which reject due process challenges
to retroactive applications of revenue acts. See id. at 1058-59 (dissecting United
States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292
(1981); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938)).
89. Id. at 1059.
90. See id. at 1059-60. For a succinct defense of the Ninth Circuit's opinion
prior to the Supreme Court decision in the case, see Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Note,
Death is Still Certain, But Are Taxes?: An Examination of the Due Process Limita-
tions on Retroactive Tax Legislation After Carlton v. United States, 67 St. John's L.
Rev. 327 (1993).
Between the time of the district court decision and the circuit decision in Carl-
ton, the District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana decided a case on the
same critical issue. Ferman v. United States, 790 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. La. 1992).
The court examined the same cases as the Ninth Circuit, but concluded in the
following manner:
The court sympathizes with and is instinctively inclined towards the
position advocated by the plaintiff. It seems fundamentally wrong for fed-
eral taxing authorities to be permitted a retroactive application of a tax in
the face of the clear and unambiguous language of a statute.... In any
event,.. . Congress is constitutionally able to change and modify our na-
tion's tax laws at will.
But, granting such amendments retroactive effect in such a way as to
adversely affect completed conduct by a citizen smacks of totalitarianism
through taxation. It seems fundamentally wrong for Congress to be per-
mitted to make any of its pronouncements retroactive to the detriment of
even one citizen for even one moment.
Such circumstance, however, seems to be the law ....
Id. at 662-63. The court feels duty bound to permit the retroactive application of
the amendment based upon the high deference standard enunciated repeatedly by
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The Supreme Court trumped all of the reasoning of the major-
ity opinion of the Ninth Circuit by distinguishing the case law and
dismantling the proposed test.91 The Court characterized the
cases relied upon by the Ninth Circuit as part of an era that "'has
long since been discarded.' "92 To the extent the three cases the
circuit court had examined in finding the violation of due process,
Nichols v. Coolidge, Blodgett v. Holden93 and Untermeyer v. Ander-
son, still retained any persuasiveness, they were distinguished
from Carlton because each involved the imposition of a "wholly
new tax."9 4 Blodgett and Untermeyer revolved around the creation
of the first gift tax, and Nichols centered around the inclusion in
the decedent's gross estate transfers made prior to death but in-
tended to take effect at death.95 All of these were novel ideas for
the time period, but the amendment in Carlton which had retroac-
tive effect cannot be considered new because it merely made an
addition to an existing statute.96
the Supreme Court. In the next and penultimate paragraph of the opinion, the
court begs a higher court to overturn its decision and alter the state of the law.
In all candor, the court, in this instance, sincerely hopes that, should its
judgment be appealed, the court (or courts) above will find error in this
ruling. Thus,... the language in section 2057's 1986 version may be ex-
plained by inadvertence and error, this court opines the hope that the ap-
pellate courts might treat this court's ruling in a similar way; that is,
while not inadvertent, the ruling is nonetheless in error.
Id. at 663.
91. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1994).
92. Id. at 34 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) and refer-
ring to the Lochner era of "exacting review of economic legislation").
93. 275 U.S. 142 (1927).
94. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34.
95. See id.
96. See id.; see also supra note 70. The distinction the Court attempts to draw
between taxes that are "wholly new" and ones that are mere alterations of existing
tax statutes is itself wholly illusory, or at best, a mere variation on arbitrariness.
The Court bases the distinction on the fact that the cases which struck down retro-
active tax statutes, viz., Blodgett and Untermeyer, arose from the "Nation's first
gift tax." Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34. However, now that taxes are imposed on income,
estates and gifts, it appears that any increase in the tax burden within one of these
broad categories will merely be an alteration and not a wholly new tax. If the
majority is correct, then the media and the American public were too harsh on
George Bush because he did keep his campaign promise of "Read my lips-no new
taxes." President George Bush, Address at the Republican National Convention
(Aug. 18, 1988). The majority offers no support for making the distinction between
a new tax and a statutory change that has the effect of increasing the tax burden
in a new manner. Justice Scalia recognized the hollow reasoning of the majority
and undermined the distinction by postulating that a change in a tax rate may be
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As for the innovative two-part test of the Ninth Circuit, the
Court discarded the principles of reliance and notice as non-dispos-
itive in less than a half page.97 Despite Carlton's uncontested reli-
ance and the fact that his "reading of the original statute on which
he relied appears to have been correct," his reliance was insuffi-
cient to show constitutional infirmity because "[tiax legislation is
not a promise."98 Additionally, the Court pointed out that detri-
mental reliance often occurs in legislation which has only a pro-
spective effect but disturbs settled expectations.99 The Court
dismissed the lack of notice issue on similar grounds because a tax-
payer must be aware the government might change the tax regula-
tions in any manner that better implements a current taxation
scheme. 10 In short, the Court gave little credence to the reason-
ing of the Ninth Circuit, and summarily sustained Congress's au-
even more harsh and oppressive than a new tax. See Carlton, 512 at 40 (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., concurring). Alluding to the facts of Carlton as "bait-and-switch tax-
ation," Justice Scalia declared that "eliminating the specifically promised reward
for costly action after the action has been taken, and refusing to reimburse the
cost, is even more harsh and oppressive, .... than merely imposing a new tax on
past actions." Id. at 39-40.
97. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-34.
98. Id. at 33. Though not stated explicitly, the thrust of this argument stems
from the fact that a person cannot successfully challenge retroactive tax legislation
based upon a contract theory. There is no offer or promise by the government, no
vested right in the individual, and therefore, no valid attack based upon detrimen-
tal reliance.
The Court's reference to the "relied-upon expectations of individuals" is curi-
ous considering the fact stated by the Ninth Circuit that " '[fWederal courts have
long been hostile to legislation that interferes with settled expectations.' " Carlton
v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Licari v. Commis-
sioner, 946 F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1991)). The modern Supreme Court is not be-
yond the scope of this comment, itself many times relying upon the notion of
settled expectations, even to uphold Fifth Amendment attacks against legislation.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992)
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("[Als
we have acknowledged time and again, '[t]he economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and.., the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations' are keenly relevant to takings analysis gener-
ally.") (alteration in original)); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,
482 (1988) ("We have recognized the importance of honoring reasonable expecta-
tions in property interests."); cf Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
16 (1976) ("[O]ur cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is
not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations.") (emphasis
added).
99. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-34.
100. See id. at 34.
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thority to enact any retroactive tax which is "justified by a rational
legislative purpose."10 1
Language also exists in the majority opinion regarding the
"curative" nature 0 2 of the retroactive amendment at issue, but
Justice O'Connor's concurrence harped on this formulation with
the obvious observation that "this mode of analysis proves too
much." 0 3 Every amendment and even new laws relating to an
area of previous regulation can be characterized as "curative" be-
cause "there is no reason to pass a new law, after all, if the legisla-
tors are satisfied with the old one."' 0 4 Realizing that she had
annihilated the majority's attempt to ratchet up the limitations on
Congress's retroactive lawmaking power beyond the low standard
of a rational basis, and observing that any tax measure may be
considered "rationally related to the legitimate governmental pur-
pose of raising revenue,"10 5 Justice O'Connor based her concur-
rence on the limited time period of the retroactivity. 0 6 In
attempting to place some restraint on the ability of Congress to
upset settled expectations retroactively, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that the fourteen month look back period in Carlton was
consistent with prior decisions.' 0 7
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined concurring,
appears to have written in a flabbergasted tone because the major-
101. Id. at 31 (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467
U.S. 717, 730 (1984)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 37. It is a truism that any regulation designed to collect a tax is a
revenue raising measure, and the amendment in Carlton eliminated a deduction
which equates to collecting more tax dollars. Interestingly, however, the original
statute's purpose was clearly not to raise revenue, as it was designed from the
start to permit large deductions.
106. See id. at 38-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. See id. Justice O'Connor believes the common link among the cases in
which the due process challenge was upheld is the relatively short time frame of
the retroactive application. See id. at 39 (citing United States v. Hernme, 476 U.S.
558 (1986) (one month); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981) (ten
months); United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937) (one month)). Yet, the fo-
cus of this analysis is inappropriate because the devastating effect of retroactive
laws occurs without regard to time constraints. When a retroactive change in the
tax infrastructure destroys the estate plan of a decedent who died even one week
prior to the enactment, Justice O'Connor's formulation offers no solace. The flaw
of creating a time period restraint is exposed by the argument presented infra Part
III.B.
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ity holding is inconsistent with precedent and the apparent mod-
em trend of the Court.10 8 The argument Justice Scalia articulated
should have led members of the Court to reach the opposite conclu-
sion, but he concurred because he does not believe the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution ever accords individuals "substantive
due process."' 0 9 Justice Scalia made the argument that this type
of case seems to fit within the framework of "fundamental rights"
jurisprudence which the modem Court has been developing under
the guise of substantive due process. 110 Although not the basis of
his decision because he does not agree with the underlying prem-
ise, Justice Scalia rebuked his colleagues in the majority for "pick-
ing and choosing among various rights to be accorded 'substantive
due process' protection" and "the categorical and inexplicable ex-
clusion of so-called 'economic rights.' "111 Though in stern opposi-
tion to the non-textual approach preserving substantive rights
through the Due Process Clause, Justice Scalia concluded his at-
tack by stating that the text of the Fifth Amendment does not dif-
ferentiate between life, liberty or property.112
III. FUNDAMENTAL CRITICISMS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
IN CARLTON
The majority opinion in Carlton comports with the Court's cur-
rent laissez-faire stance toward economic legislation, but it grants
Congress too much leeway and overlooks two important distinc-
tions: (1) even in the Court's own view certain property rights are
deemed "fundamental," and (2) the unique quality of estate taxa-
tion deserves special treatment.
108. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 39 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
109. See id. "If I thought that 'substantive due process' were a constitutional
right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it violated by bait-and-switch taxa-
tion." Id. "[Tihe Due Process Clause does not prevent retroactive taxes, since I
believe that the Due Process Clause guarantees no substantive rights, but only (as
it says) process .... " Id. at 40.
110. See id. at 40-41.
111. Id. at 41.
112. See id. at 42. The text of the Fifth Amendment reads in part: "No person
shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;..."
U.S. Const. amend. V.
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A. Property Can Be Fundamental Too
The three rights explicitly protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment are life, liberty and property."13
No differentiation exists among the terms within the text, but the
Court has repeatedly afforded these three classes of individual
rights differing degrees of protection. 1 4 "Life" and "liberty" have
been broadly interpreted to include marriage and family life,115 the
right to procreate in the future 1 6 and the right to enjoy inter-
course without procreating in the present. 1 7 The Court has
granted protection to these extensions because of their classifica-
tion as "fundamental rights." In determining which rights are fun-
damental, the Court looks to those which are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.""18
While property rights traditionally have not been afforded the
expansive protection of the other preserved rights, the fact that
property rights are "deeply rooted" in this country is more of a
maxim than an assertion. Unlike the rights protected under the
modern trend of substantive due process law which are deemed im-
plied within the concepts of life and liberty, "property" is listed ex-
pressly in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 1 9 And
113. U.S. Const. amend. V.
114. Though a full hermeneutic study would be needed to compare originalism
versus non-originalism theories of the Constitution's text, it is unnecessary to the
present discussion because both sides believe the text controls, and the text is ex-
plicit in this regard.
115. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a city
ordinance that limited occupancy to one "family" with a "family" defined as limited
categories of related individuals); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (striking down a Connecticut statute that prohibited any person, including
married couples, from using contraceptive devices).
116. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that procreation is
a "basic liberty" because it is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race").
117. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. But cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (holding there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
118. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) (supporting the parent's constitutional right to make child rearing decisions
by describing the parental role as "an American tradition"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at
496 (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring) (finding a
constitutional basis to invalidate the ban on contraceptives by labeling the tradi-
tional family relationship as "fundamental as our entire civilization").
119. It has been pointed out that even "[a] cursory examination of the Constitu-
tion reveals a deeply rooted concern for property rights." Michael J. George, Dig-
ging Up New Revenue: Retrospective Estate Taxation and the Omnibus Budget
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yet, only in the recent past have property owners begun to receive
increased protection through the Court's more intensive review of
regulations. 120 One of the most pronounced examples of the
Court's heightened scrutiny of regulations regarding property is
Dolan v. City of Tigard,121 heard the same term and decided just
eleven days after Carlton.
The complex facts of Dolan and the precise reasoning of the
Court are unimportant to the present discussion because the case
involved dedication rights which constituted an uncompensated
taking of property. 122 The pertinence of the case is the level and
process of scrutiny instituted by the Court in reviewing a state ac-
tion which infringed upon the rights of a private property owner.
The Court asked whether an "essential nexus" existed between the
dedication and a legitimate state interest.123 Finding that a nexus
did exist, the Court went further and examined "whether the de-
gree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions
bears the required relationship to the projected impact of peti-
tioner's proposed development."124 For this analysis, the Court
discarded the traditional presumption of validity and placed the
burden of proof upon the city.' 2 5 If limited to its facts, Dolan may
only stand for the proposition that legislation which interferes
with a property owner's specific right to exclude others triggers a
higher level of scrutiny. However, it remains an example of a sub-
stantive property right protected under the guise of due process.
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 96 W. Va. L. Rev. 971, 1007 (1994) (citing U.S. Const.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 3-7; art. 1, § 10, cl. 2; art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; art. VI, cl. 1;
amend. III-V & X). George's following statement bluntly summarizes why the fun-
damental quality of property rights is simply a constitutional maxim. "Rights in
property are an enumerated and thus fundamental due process right." Id. at 1009.
120. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
(holding that a taking of property had occurred when a zoning ordinance banned
construction on Lucas's coastal lots, and establishing a categorical rule that a tak-
ing occurs whenever all beneficial use of land is denied by regulation); Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that the Coastal
Commission's conditioning of a building permit on the granting of an easement
constituted a taking because it did not substantially advance a legitimate state
interest).
121. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 386 (applying the basic test the Court had formulated in Nollan, 483
U.S. at 837).
124. Id. at 388.
125. See id. at 392.
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg,
dissented in Dolan and criticized the majority specifically for the
potential precedent setting value of the case in the sphere of sub-
stantive due process. Justice Stevens stated that "[elven more con-
sequential than its incorrect disposition of this case, however, is
the Court's resurrection of a species of substantive due process
analysis that it firmly rejected decades ago."126 Justice Stevens ex-
pressed concern that the Court was taking a more active role in
defending the substantive property rights of individuals and reduc-
ing the amount of deference normally accorded legislative actions
in this area. To prevent the natural progression of the argument
in other applications, Justice Stevens beseeched that this case "not
signify a reassertion of the kind of superlegislative power the
Court exercised during the Lochner era."1 27
Without espousing the expansive and overburdening approach
of the Court in the Lochner era, at least one other area exists in
which the Court should not blindly defer to Congress-retroactive
estate taxes. When a person dies, the only tangible item left be-
hind is the person's property. One basic tenet of property law is
that a person's fundamental property rights include the right of
disposition.'12 Furthermore, the power to control the disposition of
one's property upon death is a right entrenched in American juris-
prudence.' 29 The transfer of property from a decedent to those
126. Id. at 405 (Stevens, Blackmun & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (referring to
the Lochner level of review of economic legislation and citing Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963)).
127. Id. at 409.
128. See 73 C.J.S. Property § 6 (1983).
Furthermore, the term comprises all rights which are incident to the use,
enjoyment, and disposition of tangible things .... Property is considered
to be the highest right which a man can have to anything, real or per-
sonal; it has been referred to as a perfect and exclusive right. The right of
property is a fundamental, material, inherent, and inalienable right, that
is to say, a basic civil right.
Id. § 6-7 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
129. See 79 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 1 (1975) ("The right to dispose of property by
will at death is of ancient origin .... The American law of wills is based upon, or at
least strongly influenced by, the foregoing English statutes [Statute of Wills and
Statute of Frauds] . . . ."). The importance of fulfilling the decedent's desired dispo-
sition of property is fortified by the courts' consuetudinal deference to the testator's
intent and the low level of mental capacity and competence needed to execute a
will. See John Ritchie et al., Decedents' Estates and Trusts 154 (8th ed. 1993)("Testamentary power has been granted in plenary fashion in all states and has
been curtailed in relatively few major aspects.").
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people of her selection encompasses both of these historically pro-
tected rights. The fact that the selected transferees are most often
family members adds a third layer of aegis because "the institution
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."130 It is this special conglomeration of essential, dare I say
"fundamental," property rights which are violated by retroactive
estate tax regulations.
Cognizant of the implications of finding a fundamental right,
the majority opinion in Carlton did not even address these issues,
choosing instead to avoid any risk of being chided for second-guess-
ing Congress in the province of economic legislation. Overcon-
cerned with being dubbed a "Lochnerian super-legislature," the
majority refused to recognize the fundamental rights inherently
involved when estates are taxed retroactively.
B. Estates Are Special Too
Due to its uniqueness, the estate tax field provides an excel-
lent tableau upon which the Court could begin to rewrite its review
of retroactive civil legislation. The Court could maintain consis-
tency with its other substantive due process decisions and institute
a policy of stricter scrutiny with respect to retrospective estate tax-
ation, and yet, limit the new standard to this particular field.
Aside from entailing rights that appear to be fundamental, the ret-
roactive estate tax domain should be set apart to receive special
treatment for at least three reasons.
First, an estate tax is different than an income tax because
there is no reciprocal benefit for the burden of paying an estate tax.
The Court has described taxation in general as merely "the means
by which government distributes the burdens of its cost among
those who enjoy its benefits." 131 This justification is sensible with
regard to the individual who benefits from the civilized society that
enables her to earn income and to dispose of it as she desires.
However, no such reciprocal benefit inheres in the estate tax. As-
suming the income tax imposes a burden precisely equal to the
benefits enjoyed during life, a rather conservative assumption
130. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
131. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 144 (1938). The same opinion also stated
that "lilt is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in
some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens." Id. at
146.
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given current tax rates, the burden of the estate tax would have to
be matched by a benefit accruing after death. Since the income tax
exacted already took into account the benefit of being able to dis-
pose of property as desired, any tax on the right to transfer prop-
erty at death would amount to a double tax. This consequence is
not unique to estate taxes as it occurs with other transactions such
as gifts substantial enough to require a gift tax to be paid and
purchases which necessitate the payment of a sales tax. Rather
than crafting an argument which attacks the validity of all of these
forms of tax, the point is simply that estate tax legislation could
justifiably be scrutinized under a different lens than income tax
regulations.
Second, the attendant conditions of an estate tax reinvigorate
the argument that retroactive application of laws upsets settled ex-
pectations to a greater degree than purely prospective laws. Con-
cededly, prospective legislation may have a profoundly undesirable
effect on settled property expectations. This alone will not be suffi-
cient to cause constitutional infirmity unless the burden borne by
the individual outweighs the benefit of the new regulation. The
classic test of whether a government's exercise of its police power
violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment illustrates the
point. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."13 2 Although the standard is vague be-
cause it offers no guidance as to what is considered "going too far,"
the central idea is that at some point the government regulation
becomes too oppressive upon individuals to be constitutional. 133
Retroactive application of estate tax regulations surpasses the
level of interference permitted under this standard. The fact that
the person is dead decisively alters the equation. No opportunity
exists for the decedent to recoup losses in the future. Anything
removed from the estate will be lost forever without recourse. A
132. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
133. Though the analysis of a due process attack on the application of a statute
is different than the analysis of a takings claim, the basic idea remains constant in
both. 'To justify the State in... interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public ... require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals." Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133, 137 (1894), quoted in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S.
590 (1962) (emphasis added).
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carefully crafted estate plan established to transmit wealth to the
next generation and to provide for the needs of the decedent's fam-
ily, perhaps to support minor children or disabled relatives, can be
ruined without the decedent having the opportunity to generate an
alternate course of action. Potentially destroying a legacy created
through a lifetime of turmoil is too high a price to be exacted from
an individual, especially one who is already dead.
The reason that retrospective legislation is oppressive with re-
gard to estate taxes, viz., the decedent's lack of remedy or recourse,
is also the basis of the third anomalous feature of retroactive es-
tate taxation. Specifically, retroactive estate taxation amounts to
taxation without representation. A decedent cannot voice an objec-
tion to the imposition of a new tax or a change in an existing tax
rate. If Congress decides to increase the tax burden retroactively
upon estates, all of the people who have already died but whose
estates will be subject to the tax will be controlled by a government
under which they have no representative recourse. Our Republic
is founded on the majoritarian regime which serves to counteract
the powers of the government. For example, Congress could not
impose an income tax rate of seventy-five percent without causing
a revolt. Most Americans would believe that it was not worth toil-
ing away at their jobs only to give the government three-quarters
of their income. The potential backlash from even the proposal of
such a tax makes the premise of this hypothetical rather dubious.
However, the idea is not so far-fetched in the minds of Congress
with regard to estate taxes. For thirty-five years, from 1941 to
1976, the top tax rate for estates was seventy-seven percent.134
One explanation for this seemingly excessive burden is that the
constituents it affected were all dead. Of course, those who would
be subject to the tax upon death and who were still living should
have taken action, but the procrastinating attitude of most Ameri-
cans prevailed because the issue was never imminently pressing to
a large number of voters. Though the people are to blame for per-
mitting the situation to continue, Congress derives its authority
from the people; and therefore, Congress should not have the abil-
ity to do to individuals after death what it could not do to them
during life, viz., subject a person's property to oppressive regula-
tions without fear of recourse.
134. See Bittker et al., supra note 22, at 6.
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The atypical fact that estate taxes by nature are levied upon
deceased individuals creates an unparalleled oppressiveness when
retroactive application is permitted. This unique feature of the es-
tate tax not only allows, but implores, the Court to examine retro-
active estate tax legislation for justification beyond a mere rational
relation to a legitimate purpose.
IV. CARL TON OUTCOME Is FACTUALLY ADEQUATE, BUT ITS
IMPLICATION IS UNACCEPTABLE
The Court could alter its position by accepting the arguments
presented herein without upsetting the holding in Carlton. The
Court could institute a heightened level of scrutiny for cases of
retroactive estate taxation and the outcome of Carlton could re-
main unchanged even under the new regime.
The case is distinguishable in a manner that makes the out-
come palatable and consistent with an even more stringent review.
Two crucial elements of the factual scenario create the distinction.
First, Willametta Day's death on September 29, 1985 predated the
adoption of the original statute on October 22, 1986, allowing a de-
duction for sales to employee stock option plans (ESOP) which her
executor, Carlton, tried to utilize.135 Thus, although the stock
transfer occurred after October 22, 1986, Carlton attempted to
benefit Day's estate through an essentially retrospective applica-
tion of the deduction statute. Since the deduction was not avail-
able at the time of Day's death, she should not be able to gain the
benefits of a subsequent change any more than she should be sub-
ject to the detriments of one. Second, the issue only arose due to
independent actions taken by Carlton in his capacity as executor.
This stands in contrast to the situation in which a person estab-
lishes a strategic estate plan during life for the executor simply to
effectuate after death. If Day had created a specific course of ac-
tion for Carlton to follow, it would not have included the type of
transaction in question because the ESOP deduction did not exist
during Day's lifetime. For these factual reasons, Carlton would
not obtain a favorable decision even under strict scrutiny of the
legislation. Ironically, it would be the strict bar on retroactive ap-
plication which would prevent Day's estate from benefiting from
the subsequent adoption of the ESOP deduction.
135. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1994).
146 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:119
Despite this defense of the outcome in Carlton, the Court's
analysis remains flawed and its deferential attitude in need of revi-
sion. For purposes of emphasizing the Carlton Court's faulty rea-
soning and the thrust of the arguments just presented, assume the
following scenario. On January 1, following an election year in
which a majority of incumbents lose their positions, Congress
passes legislation which changes the estate tax scheme. First, the
unified credit and the marital deduction are eliminated so that all
estates will be subject to the tax.136 Second, the regulation im-
poses a flat estate tax rate of eighty percent. Third, the effective
date of the amendments is one year prior to the date of enactment.
Under the Court's current approach, any due process chal-
lenge to these provisions will fail. The elimination of the unified
credit and marital deduction may be dubbed a curative measure
based upon congressional findings that too much revenue is being
lost through spouses creating credit shelter trusts. 137 The exorbi-
tant flat rate is justified as a needed measure to help reduce the
national debt-clearly a rational relationship to a legitimate pur-
pose. None of the changes are considered "wholly new" because
they are amendments to existing statutes. And finally, the modest
retroactive time period of one year is customary and within accept-
able limits according to the Court.138
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis does not consider the ad-
verse effects on the fundamental property rights of the people who
died in the year prior to the adopted amendments. First, those de-
cedents are subject to taxation without representation because the
majority of the representatives were elected after their deaths.
Second, the sudden increased tax burden likely will overwhelm
many decedents and their families. Having the liquidity to pay the
estate taxes is often one of the biggest problems facing the survi-
vors. A well-designed estate plan accounts for this predicament,
136. See I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2056; see also supra notes 6, 25.
137. A common estate planning technique is to create a marital trust and a
credit shelter trust to ensure that the decedent's entire unified credit is utilized or
"sheltered." In short, the credit shelter trust is fimded with the maximum amount
of property that can be transferred on without incurring an estate tax as calculated
by a fractional or pecuniary formula. The marital (spousal) trust is funded with all
of the remaining property and no estate taxes are due at the time of the first
spouse to die because of the unlimited marital deduction for property transferred
to a spouse. See I.R.C. § 2056.
138. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32-33.
19971 RETROACTIVE ESTATE TAX LEGISLATION 147
but likely would be rendered inadequate by the severity of the
amendments. Third, all estate plans centered around the common
credit shelter trust are ruined without opportunity to remedy the
situation. The effect is that many beneficiaries of credit shelter
trusts will not receive sufficient funds for their own maintenance
and support, especially in the cases of minor or mentally disabled
beneficiaries. In sum, the retroactive tax amendments devastate
even carefully designed and correctly strategized estate plans
under the tax scheme in effect at the time of their execution. The
new capricious congressional mandates utterly disrupt and rear-
range the decedent's intended proprietary disposition.
CONCLUSION
In Carlton, the Court continued to portray the submissive wife
to Congress's husbandry in the arena of retrospective civil legisla-
tion. Carlton presented the Court with the opportunity to begin
placing restrictions upon the apparent unfettered authority of Con-
gress to tax, even retroactively, under the auspices of raising reve-
nue. Though the Court did not seize the occasion, contrary to
common belief and despite the 9-0 decision, this Note has shown
that the due process challenge to retroactive legislation is not
dead, at least in regard to estate taxation. Individuals have no al-
ternative but to continue creating estate plans based upon the cur-
rent tax structure. The Court has a constitutional basis, and as
characterized by this Note, a constitutional duty, to evaluate criti-
cally congressional enactments which retroactively create, modify
or delete estate tax provisions. By splicing the unique attendant
conditions of estate taxation with the fundamental property inter-
ests involved, a thread is created that should be woven into the
modem trend of protecting individuals' basic civil rights through
the Court's looming expansive interpretation of substantive due
process.
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